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Abstract 
This paper analyzes overall economic growth performance in the Arab world since the mid 1960s, with the key 
objective of developing a better understanding about what drives the growth process in the Arab region.   Growth in 
the region since 1985 has been rather disappointing, both relative to the best performers in the developing world as 
well as compared to the pre-1985 period .  Revitalizing growth in the Arab world would, therefore, suggests asking 
two pivotal questions: why has growth in the Arab world lagged behind those developing countries that could be 
taken to represent the frontier in terms of the development discourse (East Asia)?, and why has growth been so 
erratic and unstable in the Arab world?  To address these two questions, I estimate two growth models on the 
determinants of long-term growth and the persistence of growth, using global panel data drawn from more than 130 
countries.   Consistent with received wisdom, our results suggest that growth is associated with some broad 
fundamentals: effective institutions for protection of property rights, stable macroeconomic environment, adequate 
human capital and favorable initial conditions.  In the Arab world, however, our results also show that growth does 
not happen without deliberate development strategies for exploiting (and/or overcoming) country-specific or region-
specific potentials (constraints).  We find two such growth potentials and one development constraint to be 
important in explaining the growth process in the Arab world: the advantage of location and geography; associated 
with export competitiveness and capacity to attract direct foreign investment; the “demographic gift”, associated 
with the demographic transition to lower age dependency; and the preponderance of regional and civil conflicts, 
with their multiple negative consequences for development.    
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
An earlier version of this paper was prepared as a background paper for the Arab Development Report 2001.   The 
views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the World Bank, its Board of Directors or affiliated 
organizations. The author would like to acknowledge the research assistance by John Randa, El-Daw Suliman and 
Reno Dewina.   2 
1.  Introduction 
The twenty-two Arab speaking countries of the Middle East and North Africa (hereafter the Arab 
world) constitute the League of the Arab States (LAS).  Though since its inception in 1945, the 
LAS has been mainly a political grouping of countries with common cultural and historical 
heritage, economic integration has always been high in the agenda.  Despite the failure of the 
League to develop into a viable economic grouping, there exist considerable intra-Arab 
economic interdependences, especially in the areas of labor, development assistance and 
investments.  Therefore, and despite its limited success so far as an economic grouping, the 
strong popular political commitment as well the high economic potential for deeper economic 
integration would suggest that the Arab world could potentially become a viable future economic 
grouping.   
 
One significant achievement that could be credited to the Arab countries is that they have 
managed to effectively exploit their relatively high growth for most of 1960-84 period to achieve 
considerable gains in the area of human development.  For example, due to both accelerated 
growth (in the 1970s and early 1980s) and distribution--in terms of “generous transfers to large 
parts of the population”—average schooling years increased by 100% between 1960-84 and 
1985-1998, life expectancy increased by an impressive 10 years and average income per capita 
in 1985 at (5300 in ppp $) was almost five times the income level of 1960.    A recent World 
Bank’s report on the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA
1), which include the Arab 
region, observes that,” during 1960-85 the MENA region outperformed all other regions except 
East Asia in income growth and the equality of income distribution…”  (1995:pp. 2-3).  The 
report also credits the region’s governments for effectively reducing poverty, “by 1990 only 
5.6% of the population in MENA lived on less than $1 a day---the global benchmark for absolute 
poverty---compared with 14.7% in East Asia and 28.8% in Latin America.”   
 
However, unlike East Asia growth could not be sustained in the Arab world following 1985, 
which marked the beginning of an era characterized with episodes of significant slumps in the 
price of oil, the main economic motor of the region.  In many countries of the region, growth has 
not only slowed down, but has essentially collapsed.  This brought the social progress to a 
grinding halt and kept the region standing in terms of “human well-being” well below the 
international frontiers (Ali, 2001a)
2.  Consistent with this assessment, more recent evidence due 
to Ali and Elbadawi (2000a) and Fergany (1998, 2000) suggest that poverty in the Arab world 
has actually increased Not decreased, and in some of the most populous countries like Egypt, 
Morocco, and especially Algeria and Sudan, the depth and spread of poverty have reached very 
high levels.  Moreover, the collapse of growth prevented the region from exploiting the 
“demographic gift” of an expanding pool of educated labor.  Instead, the region is faced with a 
serious unemployment crisis, only partially addressed by an expanding informal market.   
Because of its low productivity, and therefore, low income generating capacity, the informal 
sector is more a symptom of distorted economies than a window of opportunity for addressing 
poverty and unemployment in the region (Ali and Elbadawi, 2000b). 
 
                                                 
1 The Bank’s definition of the MENA region, however, does not include the four Arab countries of Sudan, 
Mauritania, Somalia and Comoros. 
2 Using a broad approach to measuring “human well-being” that includes empowerment and participation, Ali 
(2001a) finds that only 8.9% of the Arab population live in countries that belong to the medium human well-being 
category.  This leaves more than 90% of the Arab population belonging to the low human well-being category.     3 
 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that restoring growth has emerged as the top development agenda 
for the region (e.g. World Bank, 1995; Dhonte, Bhattacharya and Yousef, 2000; Makdisi, Fattach 
and Limam, 2000).  An important consideration in the analysis of growth in the Arab world is 
the diversity of the region.   Despite their common cultural and historical heritage, Arab 
countries have very diverse characteristics in such key areas as the structures of the economies, 
level of development, geographic location, and type of governance and institutions.  To highlight 
the economic diversity of the region, we follow ERF (1998) and group the countries of the 
region into four broad categories
3: mixed oil economies (MOE: Algeria, Iraq); Oil Economies 
(OE), which include the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE; diversified economies (DE: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Syria and Tunisia); and, primary export economies (PEE: Djibouti,  Mauritania, Sudan and 
Yemen).  The 1996 distribution of population and GDP over these categories was such that DE 
accounted for 48% of population and 28% of GDP; MOE’s shares in population and GDP were, 
respectively, 21 and 24%; PEE’s population share was 20% while its share of GDP was only 3% 
in contrast to that of OE with a population share of only 11% and a GDP share of 46%. Intra-
Arab diversity is also captured by differences in per capita GDP. Not surprisingly, OE ranks top 
on this scale with a per capita GDP of about US$9000 in 1996, followed by MOE (US$2400).  
DE ranks third with a per capita GDP of US$1300 while PEE’s per capita GDP amounted to 
only US$300. The production structures of the four groups differ as well. Thus, in 1996 the 
agricultural sector accounted for 24% and 23% of GDP in PEE and MOE, respectively, and for 
16% in DE while it accounts for only 2.4% of GDP in OE.  The manufacturing sector accounted 
for 14.4% of GDP in DE, 11% in MOE and OE, and 9% in PEE. Thus, none of the country 
groups of the region could be considered as industrialized (defining this stage in terms of a 
manufacturing sector contribution of 20% of GDP). Extractive industry, however, contributed 
fairly large shares in OE (35% of GDP) and MOE (27% of GDP).   
 
This paper will attempt to contribute to the debate about growth in the Arab world by asking two 
pivotal questions: why has growth in the Arab world lagged behind, especially relative to the 
East Asian frontier?; and, aside from the over-dependence on the hydrocarbon sector, are there 
any useful insight that could shed light into the collapse of growth in the Arab world in the post 
1985 period?. To analyze these two issues we would need empirical cross-country evidence on 
the determinants of the rate of per capita economic growth and on the factors influencing the 
persistence of growth in a global sample of countries.   Section two provides preliminary analysis 
of growth in the Arab world, focusing on the evolution of growth and other factors associated 
with the growth process.  Section three discusses the estimation results of two empirical growth 
models---one on the determinants of long-term growth and the other on the persistence of growth 
before and after 1985. In section four I use the estimated models to address the two questions 
posed above on why growth in the Arab world lagged behind the Asian frontier? And why has 
growth in the region collapse during the volatile post 1985 period.  Taking into consideration the 
diversity of the Arab world, the empirical models will be simulated for the various groupings 





                                                 
3 For lack of adequate data, Iraq, Libya, Palestinian territories, Somalia and Comoros are not considered.     4 
 
2.   The Story of Growth in the Arab World 
Following the collapse of the oil price in the early 1980s, per capita growth in the Arab world 
averaged just 0.5% per annum during the 1985-1998, which is just one fourth the average rate of 
growth for the earlier period of 1960-84.   Moreover, long term growth in the Arab world has 
been a far cry from the record of the high performing East Asian economies (EA), which 
managed high and sustained annual growth rates of 5% or more throughout the last 40 years 
(Table 1).  However, the experience of growth in the Arab world has also been very diverse, 
mimicking the diversity of its economies.  For example, the DE has achieved growth rates higher 
than 4% during the first period, which could not be maintained following 1984.  The same 
applies for some OE countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Oman, which grew very rapidly in the 
first period but saw their growth collapse in the second.  Even by the standards of Sub-Saharan 
Africa---the region that retains the dubious distinction of being the most underdeveloped region 
of the world---the growth record of the PEE group has been sluggish throughout the two periods 
(at 1 and –0.5%, respectively).  The growth record of Algeria (representing the MOE) has been 
one of significant growth collapse from 2.5 in the first period to –1.2% in the second.   In 
addition to Iraq, for which no data is available
4, the post-1984 period has so far been lost to 
development for the many countries of the region with persistent negative growth rates, 
including Algeria, UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia; and particularly the poorer non-oil surplus 
countries of Jordan, Djibouti and Yemen.   Moreover, average growth in the Arab region has also 
been volatile, where growth volatility in the Arab world accounts for more than five times that of 
East Asia (Table 1).  Also compared to the East Asian frontier (or to Sub-Saharan Africa in the 
case of PEE) annual profiles of growth suggest that it has been very volatile in all regions of the 
Arab world (Figures 1.A-D).  Also growth volatility in the Arab world has disproportionately 
rose between the two periods, where relative variability in the post 1984 period (at 5.6) accounts 
for more than twice the rate of variability in the earlier period.   
 
The received wisdom from the modern growth literature
5 and countless development experiences 
suggest that high growth is associated with some broad fundamentals: effective institutions for 
protection of property rights, stable macroeconomic environment, adequate human capital and 
favorable initial conditions.  In most cases, however, growth does not happen without deliberate 
development strategies for exploiting (and/or overcoming) country-specific or region-specific 
potentials (constraints).  We characterize two such growth potentials and one development 
constraint of relevance to the case of the Arab world: the advantage of location and geography; 
associated with export competitiveness and capacity to attract direct foreign investment; the 
“demographic gift”, associated with the demographic transition to lower age dependency; and 
the preponderance of regional and civil conflicts, with their multiple negative consequences for 
development. 
 
                                                 
4 The economic sanctions imposed on the country of Iraq and its people constitute the most severe and drastic 
external shocks of all kinds, where the collapse of economic growth has been a rather minor consequences of their 
far reaching and intractable devastation. 
5 A very partial list includes: Easterly and Levine (2001), Romer (1986), Lucas (1997), Barro (1997), Sala-i-Martin 
(1997), among others.  See also an excellent review by Ali (2001b) of evidence on the most robust determinants 
of cross-country growth and their likely impact on the sustainability of growth in the Arab states.   5 
 
2.i  Traditional Growth Fundamentals:  
The comparisons between the two periods (1960-84, 1985-98) would suggest that the record of 
the Arab world in terms of human indicators has been one of considerable achievements.   
However, the MOE, and especially the PEE, would still have to overcome a big gap relative to 
the Asian frontier (Table 2).  For example, life expectancy has risen considerably in the region, 
where it rose from 56 to 64 in MOE, 58 to 67 in DE, 43 to 51 in PEE, and in the case of OE it 
rose from 60 to 72  to surpass EA.  Even a more compelling achievement was in the area of 
education, where average number of years of schooling (for the age group from 15 to 65) more 
than doubled to reach 5 in DE and 6 in OE, only one year behind the average for EA.  However, 
the averages for MOE (at 4)  and PEE (at 2) are still very low.  Consistent with the significant 
progress at the social and human capital fronts, per capita income has also risen considerably 
between 1960 and 1985, excepts for the case of PEE.  This could be directly related to the steady 
growth achieved by many countries in the region between the two periods.  It is also important to 
note that, except for the OE, for which average per capita income was almost double that of EA 
(at $6000), income in the rest of the Arab world (about $1800 for MOE, $1500 for DE and only 
$300 for PEE) is still much lower than the median income for East Asia.  Unfortunately, the 
Arab countries were unable to realize rapid catch-up growth in the post-1985 period, though they 
started off with much lower standards of livings compared to EA.  However, growth is a 
complex process, which depends on much more than being poorer at an initial date (Easterly and 
Levine, 2001).   
 
One measure of the quality of the overall policy and institutional environment is provided by the 
World Bank’s “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Index: (CPIA).”
6  The PEE group 
has the lowest CPIA ratings for 1985 (at 2.1), which is well below the African average of 2.75 
(Figure 2.A).  Moreover, more than a decade later this Arab group continues to be at almost the 
same impoverished rating.  The other Arab group for which the CPIA index is available was the 
DE group, which managed to improve its ratings considerably from 2.8 in 1985 to 3.4 in 1998.  
However, the quality of the overall policy and institutional environment in the DE group in 1998 
still remains well below that of East Asia at 4.2. Another important set of measures of 
institutional environment is reported by the Political Risk Service Group (PRS), which construct 
the famous International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  We construct a composite index using 
principal components derived from ten institutional variables (Figure 2.B).  This data is available 
for East Asia and three groups of Arab economies (DE, MOE, OE).  This index also suggests 
that the Arab countries were significantly lagging behind East Asia in 1980-84.   The combined 
institutional index for EA was more than 7, compared to 5.2 for OE, 4.5 for DE, and 3.5 for 
MOE.   Despite the significant improvement in the index in DE (by more than 40% in 1995-99 
relative to 1980-84) and to some extent in OE (by 20%), the Arab region still remains well below 
East Asia according to this measure as well.  Ali (2001b: Table 13) analyzed the five PRS 
indicators of risk for 15 Arab countries between 1985 and 1997.  He finds that all the Arab 
countries considered achieved impressive progress in the area of “Government Repudiation” of 
contract, where all countries attain ratings of 8 or 9 in 1997, with a rating of 10 indicating a zero 
                                                 
6 Quality refers to how conducive the policy and institutional framework to promoting poverty-reducing growth and 
how effective in using developing assistance.  Each of the 20 components, which were rated ordinally by country 
specialists on a scale of 1 to 6 according to a standardized criteria, were assigned equal weights of 0 .05.  
   6 
risk of repudiation.  Except for the case of Iraq, the same progress was achieved in the area of 
“Expropriation”, which measures the risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalization.   
However, the Arab world’s ratings remain low with regards to the three remaining indicators of 
“Corruption”, “Rule of Law” and “Quality of Bureaucracy”. 
In terms of specific aspects of the macro-institutional environments, several patterns could be 
identified (Table 3).  First, compared to EA the Arab world is characterized by larger sizes of 
governments, especially in the OE.  For example, the share of government expenditure to GDP in 
1985-98 reached 49% in OE, rising from 34% in 1960-84.  This of course is related to the 
dependence of these economies on the oil sector, which experienced considerable boom between 
the two periods.  However, even in the cases of DE and PEE, where the public sector was 
significantly downsized between the two periods, it nevertheless, remains large relative to EA.  
The shares of public expenditure in the latter periods averaged 32 and 33% for DE and PEE, 
respectively, compared to only 20% for EA.   Second, except for the MOE (Algeria), private 
investment has been low in other Arab regions for which data is available
7.  While private 
investments in EA rose between the two periods from 19 to 24%, it continues to be very low at 
14% for DE and 11% for PEE, where the latter is comparable to the average for SSA.   On the 
other hand private investment in Algeria declined from 29% in the first period to 20%.  The high 
private investment in Algeria was mainly associated with the oil and gas sector.   Public 
investment has been high during the first period for Algeria (at 12%) and DE (at 14%), though it 
was significantly reduced in the second period to ratios comparable with the ones prevailing in 
EA and SSA (at 9%).   However, public investment for the case of the PEE has basically 
collapsed, where between the two periods it declined from 10 to just 6%
8.    Third, except for the 
PEE and to some extent MOE (Algeria), Arab countries have achieved high financial depth 
(measured in terms of the share of broad money to GDP), comparable to the East Asian ratios.  
Fourth, also the OE and the DE have managed to achieve a measure of macroeconomic stability 
(low inflation) comparable to EA.   Finally, in terms of openness of the economy, only the OE 
could be considered as open as EA.  The others, especially the MOE remains very closed.  
2.ii  Geography, Demography and Conflicts:  
In addition to sound overall macroeconomic and institutional environment as well as rapid 
accumulation of human and physical capitals, growth has also been linked in the modern growth 
literature to factors associated with “geography and ecology”, “demographic transition” and 
political and criminal violence, at national, regional or international levels.  All three set of 
factors are likely to be strong determinants of growth in the Arab world.  On the first issue Sachs 
and his research associates
9 argue that favorable geography and ecology--in terms of access to 
long coastal lines or sea navigable rivers and temperate climate—are robustly associated with 
superior growth record.  This literature suggests several channels through which favorable 
geography and ecology could promote overall economic growth.  A high share of a country’s 
area around coastal lines or sea navigable rivers and high economic density along the coast are 
important determinants of competitiveness, especially for transaction-intensive exports, such as  
manufactures. Moreover, a high share of non-tropical (especially temperate) regions in a country 
                                                 
7 This does not include the OE, for which no data on private and public investment is available. 
8 For a detailed analysis of  the investment environment in the Arab world, see Elbadawi (1999a). 
9 Sachs, J. and A.M. Warner (1997), Bloom, D. and J. Sachs (1998), J.L. Gallup and J. Sachs   (1998).  See also Elbadawi, 
I. (1999b). 
   7 
is associated with less prevalence of vector-borne diseases and high agricultural productivity.  
Figure 3 suggests that EA, OE and to some extent DE are endowed with long coastal lines and 
dense economic activity along the coast, while the case of MOE is one of high density but very 
small coastal regions, relative to the land area (Algeria, Iraq).  While the PEE are endowed with 
longer coasts than SSA, their coasts remain substantially underutilized, where population density 
at the coastal areas of PEE was less than a third of the average density for SSA.  Compared to the 
non-PEE regions of the Arab world, SSA is itself geographically isolated and has low economic 
density at the coast.   Except for the DE group, all other countries in the Arab world as well as 
EA and Africa are dominated by non-temperate zones (more than 95%).  While this evidence 
suggests that the DE group has a non-exploited potential, the large share of non-temperate 
regions in Asia does not seem to have harmed East Asia’s economic development. 
Second, many countries in the region, most notably Egypt, have entered the period in its 
demographic transition during which the working age population is increasing relative to the rest 
of the population (Table 4).  For example, it is projected that by the year 2010 the working age 
population in Egypt will be twice the size of the dependent population.  It has been argued that 
this type of demographic transition offers “a demographic window of opportunity”, where the 
high shares of the working age population fosters accelerated and sustained economic growth by 
increasing labor participation and savings (Yousif, 1997).   However, it must be emphasized that 
for Egypt and other countries of the region to realize such opportunity, growth must create 
enough jobs to absorb the huge growth in its working age population.  
Finally, growth is also affected by conflicts (both civil and regional conflicts), of which the 
region has more than its fair share (Table 5 and Figures 4.A &B).  First, there is the ongoing 
Arab Israeli conflict, which affects the region as a whole, especially Lebanon and the Palestinian 
territories.  Second, there were the two major Gulf wars (1980-1988, 1991), which have had 
devastating regional implications, especially for Iraq.  Third, there are several civil wars that 
erupted in many countries in the region, the most devastating of which is the still unresolved 
Sudanese civil war, which has so far accounted for 34 years of the countries 45 years of 
existence as an independent state.   The Lebanese civil war, which has direct links to the Arab-
Israeli conflict, has also been costly
10.   Though regional and international wars are likely to have 
more immediate and substantial effects on physical capital than civil wars, the latter could have 
more devastating effects on development because they also destroy "social" capital
11 (Collier, 
1999).   Instead, the former could actually foster social capital.  Moreover, it has been argued 
that intense military and ideological threats from the former Soviet Union and China might have 
been a decisive factor in forcing the Republic of Korea and the Province of Taiwan to become 
developmental states.  However, the two Gulf wars and the Arab-Israeli conflict have in all 
likelihood impaired development of the region by scaring foreign investments, distorting 
expenditure and possibly fostering bad governance.  
   
                                                 
10 For analysis of the economic cost of the Sudanese civil war, see Elbadawi (1999c); and for a similar analysis for 
Lebanon, see Makdisi (2001).  
11 The concept of "social capital" used in this analysis follows Putnam (1993), who defines social capital as," the 
features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions." 




Table 1:  Growth Performance in the Arab World 
  1960-84 1985-98 




Mixed Oil Economies  2.5  4.3  -1.2  2.3 
   Algeria  2.5  4.3  -1.2  2.3 
Oil Economies  0.0  2.0  0.3  8.9 
   United Arab Emirates  -3.0  3.2  -2.9  2.8 
   Bahrain  -5.0  1.5  -0.1  32.3 
   Kuwait  -5.7  1.5  4.8  3.0 
   Oman  10.2  2.0  1.1  3.5 
   Qatar  -  -  -  - 
   Saudi Arabia  3.6  1.9  -1.5  2.8 
Diversified Economies  4.3  1.4  1.7  3.2 
   Egypt  3.8  1.0  2.1  0.7 
   Jordan  7.3  1.1  -1.3  4.8 
   Lebanon  -  -  4.2  4.8 
   Morocco  2.8  1.2  1.5  3.9 
   Syria  3.7  2.7  1.5  3.7 
   Tunisia  3.7  1.1  2.1  1.4 
Primary Exports Economies  1.0  3.8  -0.5  5.9 
   Djibouti  -    -4.9  0.5 
   Mauritania  2.0  3.8  0.6  3.1 
   Sudan  0.0    2.4  2.7 
   Yemen  -    -0.3  17.4 
Arab World  2.0  2.1  0.5  5.6 
       
East Asia  5.2  0.6  5.0  1.0 
   Hong Kong  6.7  0.6  3.4  1.4 
   Indonesia  3.8  0.9  3.7  1.6 
   Malaysia  4.4  0.5  3.5  1.3 
   Singapore  6.9  0.6  5.2  0.7 
   South Korea  6.6  0.6  6.2  0.7 
   Thailand  4.4  0.5  6.5  0.5 
Sub Saharan Africa  1.1  4.4  0.4  6.8 
Source:   Global Development Network Growth  database     
Notes:     Growth rates is an average per capita GDP per annum 
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Table 2:  Human Development and Initial Conditions in the Arab World 
  Average Schooling Years  Life expectancy at birth  GDP per capita 
  1960-84 1985-98 1960-84 1985-98 1960  1985 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Arab  World  2 4 55  65  1190  5275  40 
Mixed Oil Economies  2  4  56  64  1145  1859  39 
Oil  Economies  3 6 60  72  2232  11429   
Diversified  Economies 2 5 58  67  510  1543  41 
Primary Exports Economies  0  2  43  51  -  315  - 
East  Asia  5 7 62  71  1442  6097  40 
Sub Saharan Africa  2  3  46  51  601 862 46 
Source: Global Development Network Growth Database and International Data on Educational Attainment (Robert J  




Table 3:  Macroeconomic Environment in the Arab World 
  Govt. Expend  Priv Investment  Pub Investment  M2/Y  Openness  Inflation 
  1972-84 1985-98 1960-84 1985-98 1960-84 1985-98 1960-84 1985-98 1960-84 1985-98  1960  1985 
MOE      29 20 12 10 35 54 58 45  8  17 
OE  34  49       29  61  118  114  7  2 
DE  39 32 14 14 14 11 42 78 65 78  8  10 
PEE  43 33 12 11 10  6  17 39 64 74 14 39 
Arab World  27 30 16 14 13  9  32 62 87 86 12 17 
EA  20 20 19 24  8  9  37 61  102  136  25  5 
SSA  26 30 10 11 10  9  19 24 64 70 14 20 
SOURCE: GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT NETWORK GROWTH 
DATA 
        
Government Expenditures = all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including  
                                              compensation of employees). Data are in percentage of GDP 
Private Investment  = gross domestic investment-public investment as percentage of GDP 
Public Investment  =  gross domestic investment-private investment as percentage of GDP 
M2/Y                     =   Money and quasi money comprise the sum of the currency outside banks, demand deposits  
                                    other than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency  
                                    deposits of resident sector other than central government. Data are in percentage of GDP. 
Openness              =    calculated as export and import of goods and services over GDP 
Inflation rate         =    measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to  
                                    the average consumer of acquiring a fixed basket of good and services.  
 
 
Table 4. Demography and Labor Market: Shares to total population 
            
   young age dependency  old age dependency  working age population  labor force 
   (0-14)  (> 64 years)  (15-64)    
   1960-84 1985-98  1960-84  1985-98  1960-84 1985-98  1960-84  1985-98 
Arab World  44  41  3  3  52  55  35  36 
Mixed Oil Economies  46  42  3  3  50  55  27  28 
Oil Economies  43  42  3  3  54  56  31  34 
Diversified Economies  43  39  4  4  53  57  34  35 
Primary Exports Economies  45  45  3  3  52  52  48  47 
East Asia  41  32  3  4  56  63  41  47 
Sub Saharan Africa  47  46  4  4  50  51  48  46 
Source: SIMA database           
 





Table 5:  Incidence of Civil, Regional and International Wars (1960-2001) 
        
   Civil Wars  Regional/International Wars 
   Years of war  No. of years  Years of war  No. of years 
Mixed Oil Economies     12     9.7 
   Algeria  1962, 1991-99  9       
   Iraq  1961-74  14  1961-63, 1973, 1974-75,  9.7 
        1980-88, 1990-91    
Oil Economies     10     0.4 
   United Arab Emirates  -    1991 0.3 
   Bahrain  -    1991 0.3 
   Kuwait  -    1990-91 0.7 
   Libya       1978-79 1.0 
   Oman  1965-75  10  1991  0.3 
   Qatar  -    1991 0.3 
   Saudi Arabia  -    1973, 1991  0.3 
Diversified Economies     13     4.0 
   Egypt  -    1967, 1969-70, 1973, 1991  1.7 
   Jordan  1971  1  1967, 1973  0.2 
   Lebanon  1965-75, 1975-90  25  1992-2001  9.0 
   Morocco  1975-89  14  1975-83, 1991  8.3 
   Syria  -    1967, 1973, 1982, 1991  0.7 
   Tunisia  -         
Primary Exports Economies     14     3.7 
   Djibouti  1991-94  3       
   Mauritania  -    1975-79 3.7 
   Sudan  1963-72, 1983-..  27       
   Yemen  1962-69, 1986, 1990-94  12       
Arab World     13     2.6 
             
East Asia     14     4.8 
   Hong Kong  -         
   Indonesia  1963-66, 1975-82, 1986, 1999  12  1975-77  1.6 
   Malaysia  -         
   Singapore  -         
   South Korea  -    1965-73 7.7 
   Thailand  1967-83  16  1967-73  5.3 
Sub Saharan Africa     14     3 















Notes to Figure 2.A: 
The CPIA is composed of 20 components covering four categories: macroeconomic management and 
sustainability of reforms; policies for sustainable and equitable growth; policies for reducing inequality; 
































PEE Arab Countries DE Arab Countries SSA E. Asia
Regions
Figure 2A: Overal Policy and Institutional Environment







Notes to Figure 2.B: 
1. Percentage values are scaled sown by a factor of 6 
2.The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), is a composite index of the quality of institutions derived 
by principle component from ten institutional variables, namely: Government stability, socioeconomic 
conditions, investment profile, corruption, involvement of military in politics, involvement of religion in 
politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability, bureaucracy quality. Scores for these 
variables (for each country) were assigned and published by the PRS Group.  We construct an overall index 
based on 10 ICRG indicators using principal components: Government stability (0.31); Socioeconomic 
Conditions (0.31); Investment Profile  (0.33); Corruption (0.34); Involvement of Military in Politics (0.34);  
Involvement of Religion in Politics (0.20); Law and Order (0.36); Ethnic Tensions(0.26); Democratic 
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Figure 2.B: International Country Risk by Region
ICRG in 1980-84 period % change in ICRG from 1980-84 period to 1995-1999 period  15 
Notes to figure 3: 
1. The actual number for density of 100k around the coastal and sea navigable rivers in  East Asia is divided by 7 ( 
actual number is 1538.8) 
Note to figure 4.A: 
 Duration refers to the average length of conflict for countries experiencing civil wars (see Table 5) 
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Figure 4.A: Average Duration (in years) and No. of Countries that Experiencied of 
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Note to Figure 4.B: 
Duration refers to the average length of conflict for countries involved in a regional/international war ( see 
Table 5)   16 
 
3.  The Growth Process in and outside the Arab World 
Using the above endogenous growth framework—argued above as the most appropriate for 
explaining the growth process in the Arab region---I proceed to estimate two growth models in 
this section.  The first is a long-term endogenous growth model, using global panel data drawn 
from more than 130 countries.  The second is a persistence of growth model specifying the 
dynamics of growth between the two periods before and after 1985.  This year, as the analysis of 
the previous section suggests, marked the end of the era of positive and relatively high per capita 
growth in the Arab world.  The key determinants of the persistence of growth are the capacity of 
nations to manage shocks (such as the one that impacted the Arab world in the post 1984 era) 
without resorting to shortsighted growth retarding policies.  This key concept will be developed 
below in the context of the persistence of growth analysis.  
 
3.i Long-term  Growth:  
I estimate an endogenous growth model for a panel of 134 countries over seven period-averages: 
1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-98 (Table 6a-b).  The reported 
regression results are based on random and fixed-effects models, which also controls for period 
and country-specific effects (not represented).  The diagnostic tests (at the bottom of Table 6a) 
rejects the simple pooled OLS model in favor of random and fixed-effects models (Breush Pagan 
test); and subsequently the Hausman test rejects the random-effects in favor of the fixed-effects 
model of Table 6b.  Hence we will confine our analysis to the results of the fixed-effects model.  
The results corroborates the version of the endogenous growth model we discussed in Section 2 
above as the most relevant framework for explaining growth in the Arab region. The results 
suggest that standard growth fundamentals (initial income, human capital and policy and 
institutional environment) are significantly associated with long-term growth, and that their 








































Average Duration (years) No. of countries  17 
effects are consistent with theory.  In addition, the two geography variables were also strongly 
linked to cross-country growth.  High economic density along the coast or sea navigable rivers 
tends to spur growth, while a high share of a country’s land area covered by non-temperate 
climate has adverse effect on growth.  Finally, civil wars tend to have substantial negative 
consequences for subsequent growth.  However, we fail to find robust association between 
regional/international wars and growth. 
  
The failure of the model to corroborate the likely deleterious effects on growth of 
regional/international wars suggests a possible co-variation between the set of the explanatory 
variables.  Its likely that the CPIA (or ICRG) ratings takes into consideration the degree of 
political tensions in the region, which suggests estimating an IV growth model with CPIA (or 
ICRG) treated as endogenous.  An alternative estimation strategy to deal with this problem is to 
specify two models with CPIA (or ICRG) and regional/international wars included one at a time.  
The latter approach produced better results, as the IV regressions fail to produce robust results.  
The results of the two additional models are reported as Model 2a, 2b and 2c (2a’, 2a’’, 2a’’’) in 
Table 6b.   The CPIA-based models appear to be uniformly better than their ICRG-based 
counterpart.  Hence we will focus on the CPIA-based family of regressions.   Model 2a (with 
CPIA and without regional/international war dummy) produces a very strong and theoretically 
consistent effect for CPIA with other growth fundamentals remaining robustly associated with 
growth.  As for the other model (2b&c), which excludes CPIA but includes international and 
regional wars, all other variables including the former were found to be significant except for 
primary education, which was subsequently dropped from the regression.  Given that this model 
is clearly more restrictive, because it forces elimination of policy and institution environment as 
well as human capital variables, I will only consider the model 2a for further analyses. Moreover, 
the chosen model is superior to the other in terms of overall explanatory power.   18 
Table 6a: Random Effects Model Regression: Dependent Variable- Real GDP Per capita growth 
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89.04[0.000]   19 
Table 6b: Fixed Effects Model Regression: Dependent Variable- Real GDP Per capita 




Primary School Enrolment 
 
Demographic Gift  
Log(Labor force/total population) 
 






Population Density at the Coast 
 








Number of observation 



































































































































































0.6743   20 
3.ii Persistence of Growth: 
We estimate the determinants of growth persistence before and after 1985, which marked the 
beginning of major episodes of external shocks that affected the Arab world.  The regression was 
based on an error-correction persistence model, and the estimation results are reported in Table 7 
below.  Following Rodrik (1998a), the key variable in this regression is “Conflict”, which reflect 
the capacity (or the inability rather) of a society for managing external shocks
12. External shocks 
can be economically costly, when social divisions run deep (due, for example, to high income-
inequality) and the societies institutions for conflicts management are weak.  Therefore, this 
variable suggests that the combination of deep social conflicts and weak social and political 
institutions tends to magnify the effects of external shocks on growth, by leading to growth-
retarding policies (the precise definition of “Conflict” is provided in the notes to Table 7). The 
estimated coefficient for Conflict was highly robust and fairly stable across nine different 
regressions, using three different measures of Conflict. The model also accounts for error-
correction effects, which is the lagged residual of the estimated long-run growth regression 2a of 
Table 6a.  This variable suggests that growth in the current period must accelerate, if growth in 
the previous period was lower than the rate consistent with long-term equilibrium growth.  The 
estimated error-correction effect was also highly significant as well as consistent with theoretical 
predictions.  In addition to these two effects, the model also accounts for the potential role of 
changes in CPIA (the overall institutional and policy environment) in the dynamics of growth.  
This variable partially reflects the economic reforms adopted by many countries, including some 
in the Arab region, in response to the post 1984 shocks and at the behest of the International 
Financial Institutions.  An increase in the CPIA was robustly and positively associated with 
acceleration of growth. 
                                                 
12 The measure of external shock we use is the standard deviation of the first log-difference of the terms of trade 
multiplied by the average share of total trade in GDP in the initial period.  This measure captures the 
unexpected component of the volatility of the streams of income associated with foreign trade. Assuming that 
the terms of trade follow a random walk (possibly with a drift) Rodrik (1998b) shows that this measure is the 
theoretically appropriate measure of external volatility.  Moreover, Rodrik  argues that the fact that this 
measure treats positive terms-of-trade shocks identically as negative shocks is justified, since positive income 
shocks could also trigger the same kind of distributional conflicts that obtain under negative shocks.   21 
 
Table 7: Persistence of Growth Regression (Rate of Growth in 1985-1999 minus rate of 
growth for 1965-84) 
 










     -0.1117  0.0984  10.27  86 
B1   -0.0001 
(-2.640) 
    -0.1690  0.0677  6.96  83 
C1     -0.0002 
(-3.160) 
   -0.1652  0.0953  9.96  86 
A2 -0.0002 
(-2.050) 
  -0.6107 
(-4.220) 
 0.2527  0.3568  17.36  60 




 0.1243  0.3386  13.82  57 




 0.1361  0.3459  16.60  60 
A3 -0.0002 
(-2.520) 




0.3226 0.4573  17.58  60 






0.1318 0.3947  13.17  57 






0.2204 0.4494  17.05  60 
Notes: 
1.   Confl1 = standard deviation of ∆(LTOT)65-84 x openness65-84 x (20-polity65-84 ) x gini65-84  
2.   Confl2 = standard deviation of ∆(LTOT)70-79 x openness70-79 x (20-Polity70-79 ) x gini70-79  
3.   Confl3 = standard deviation of ∆ (LTOT)70-84 x openness70-79 x (20-polity70-84 ) x gini70-79  
4.   Polity   = 10+Democracy-autocracy, where both democracy and autocracy range from 0 to 10.  
                      Polity is a composite index widely used in the political science literature. 
5.   Error Correction term= Predicted Annual rate of growth (1955-84) minus actual average annual rate  
of growth (1965-84) 
6.   Change in Policy= Average CPIA (1985-1999) minus Average CPIA (1965-1984)   22 
 
4.  The Failure of Growth in the Arab  
Taking the East Asian economic performance as the development frontier for the region, the two 
pivotal questions this paper would like to ask are: why has there been (relatively) little growth in 
the Arab world?; and, why has the growth, as little as it may be, collapsed following the post-
1985 hocks.  Using the growth regressions of the previous section, we now have the necessary 
ingredients to address these questions, at least in a context of a partial equilibrium framework.  
 
4.i  Why has the Arab World Grown so Little? 
Using the long-run growth regression results (Model 2a of Table 6b) we address the question 
regarding the sources of growth that allow the East Asian countries to outperform the Arab world 
by simulating the sources of the growth differential between East Asia and each of the three 
middle and high income Arab countries (MOE, OE and DE).  In addition we also simulate the 
growth differential between DE and PEE.  The simulation results pertain to the period of 1985-
1988 (Table 8).  The results suggest that relative to EA, MOE and DE have had huge catch up 
effect that could be exploited to generate economic growth, because their initial incomes are 
much lower than those prevailing in the high performing Asian economies.  The exception are 
the oil-rich economies of the Arab world, which has no catch up effect to exploit being much 
richer than the East Asian economies.  On the other hand, the poorer Arab countries (PEE) have 
huge growth potential to the relatively richer middle-income diversified economies of the Arab 
world.  Clearly, such potential could materialize in a context of a deeper economic integration in 
the Arab region.  The huge catch up effect which accounts for 6-7% growth differential is not 
likely to be outweighed by the superior performance of EA in the area of human capital 
accumulation, which tended to be rather small in comparison to each of MOE, DE, and to a 
lesser extent OE.  However, the PEE group lags behind DE rather significantly in terms of 
human capital accumulation, leading to a much less net conditional convergence effect (the sum 
of the initial income and primary school enrollment effect) of only 5.6% compared to 7.2% for 
unconditional convergence effect.   
 
The second most significant source of growth in favor of EA (as well as PEE relative of DE) has 
been the effect due to the net demographic gift.  This effect has allowed, other things equal, EA 
to grow by more than 8% compared to MOE and by more than 3% compared to OE and by 
almost 6% compared to DE.  Discounting the effect of migrant labor in the case of OE would 
suggest that this effect is much stronger than indicated by the 3.3% growth differential.  On the 
other hand, the PEE group had an advantage in terms of the augmented demographic gift of more 
than 2% per capita growth relative to the DE group.  The major failure of the middle and high 
income Arab countries (MOE, OE, DE) to generate sufficient job opportunities to absorb the 
rising demand for labor, associated with their demographic transitions, is at the heart of the 
failure of these countries to achieve high growth, or to prevent massive unemployment, 
especially among educated youth.  
Geography appears to be a very significant source of growth differentials between the groups.  
Despite smaller shares of coastal lines to land area in EA (relative to DE and OE), the much 
higher economic density along the coasts of EA compared to the Arab region translated into 
higher growth for the former.  The higher East Asian growth due to this effect amounted to 4% 
relative to OE, 1.3% relative to MOE and 1.9% relative to DE.  However, the superior EA   23 
performance due to the effect of coastal economic density is more than outweighed by the 
climate effect in the case of DE, where the marginal contribution of the latter equaled almost 
3.5% in favor of the DE group.  This would lead to a net growth of  about 1.5% in favor of DE.  
However, the combined effect of the geography factors would remain in favor of EA relative to 
both of OE and MOE.  Within the Arab region, both factors of geography would contribute to 
perpetuating the poverty of the low income PEE relative to the middle income DE.  The 
combined effects of climate and coastal economic density translated into more than 8% of per 
capita growth in favor of the DE group. 
In terms of policy and institutional environment, EA has dominated the middle-high income 
Arab world where its superior performance accounts for more than 1.2% higher growth relative 
to MOE and DE and almost 1% of higher growth than OE.  On the other hand, poorer 
institutional and policy environment in the PEE (relative to DE) is estimated to have accounted 
for more than half a percentage of the positive DE-PEE growth differential. Finally, in general 
the effect of civil wars appears to be relatively marginal in explaining growth differentials 
between the groups.  The two exceptions are the case of EA-MOE and to a lesser extent DE-
PEE, where civil wars had, respectively, accounted for 0.8% and 0.4% of the growth 
differentials.   Clearly the indirect effects of civil wars through institutions and other channels 
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Table 8: Growth Performance in the Arab World and East Asia (1985-1998) 
 
Variable  Coeffecient
a  EA-MOE  EA-OE  EA-DE  DE-PEE 
           
Initial Conditions/Human Capital           
Initial Income  -6.899  -6.20  6.26  -7.65  -7.21 
Primary school enrollment  0.039  0.03  0.40  0.17  1.62 
           
Demographic Gift           
Proportion of labor force size to population size (in Log)  15.078  8.20  3.33  5.74  -2.06 
           
Policy and Institutional Environment            
CPIA  0.904  1.27  0.98  1.20  0.53 
           
Geography           
Population Density at the Coastal/ Sea Navigable River  2.144  1.31  4.00  1.89  4.50 
Proportion of Land in Non-Temperate Zone (in Log)  -0.146  -0.44  0.14  -3.44  3.61 
           
Conflict           
Start of Civil War  -1.512  0.81  -0.20  0.05  0.38 
           
Explained Difference    4.97  14.90  -2.04  1.38 
Actual Difference    5.41  5.30  3.16  0.50 
Unexplained Difference    0.44  -9.60  5.20  -0.89 
           
Note:  The coefficients are from Model 2A of Table 6B           
         EA= East Asia           
         MOE= Mixed Oil Economies           
         OE= Oil Exporting Economies           
         DE= Diversified Economies           
         PEE= Primary Exporting Economies           
 
 
4.ii  Why has Growth Collapsed in the Arab World? 
A comparison of average growth rates for the Arab region and East Asia during 1970-1999 
suggests that there are three episodes (1970-84, 1985-94, 1995-1999) of different growth patterns 
(Table 9).  While growth in the Arab world collapsed between the first two periods, the East 
Asian countries were able to maintain their stellar growth performance throughout the two 
periods.  However, the Arab world appears to be on the verge of a hesitant recovery since the 
second half of the 1990s, while East Asian growth dropped by 50% as a result of the recent 
financial crises that impacted the region.   It is also pertinent to point out that between the first 
two periods, growth had also decelerated (though not as massively as in the Arab world) in Latin 
America as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa.  On the other hand, growth had accelerated in South 
Asia, even by more impressive margins than in East Asia  (Table 10).  Focusing on the collapse 
of growth in the Arab world between the first two periods, we analyze below the main sources 
contributing to it.   
   25 
 
 
Using the models of Table 7, we decomposed the measured persistence of growth in Asia (or 
collapse of growth in other regions, including the Arab world) into three components (Table 10). 
These factors are the capacity of a society to manage the impact of exogenous shocks, 
represented by the variable “Conflict”; the change in overall institutional and policy 
environment; and the automatic error-correction effect that depends on whether actual growth is 
lower or higher than predicted growth at the initial period.  
First, the role of capacity for managing conflicts following external shocks, was by far the most 
dominant factor behind the collapse of growth in the Arab World.  This factor--which could be 
interpreted as a measure of low social cohesion—contributed –0.7% to the collapse of growth in 
the region.   This accounts for about a fourth of the growth collapse experienced by the region, 
which was much larger than similar effects for other regions.  Though this is mainly due to the 
intensity of the shocks that impacted the Arab region rather than a sudden collapse in social 
cohesion; the moral of these findings is that promoting social group cooperation is, perhaps, the 
best available defense against external shocks.   
 
Second, unlike other regions, the Arab world (and to a lesser extent South Asia) appear to have 
grown much faster in the first period than would be predicted by the fundamentals.  This is 
reflected in the negative influence of the error-correction effect, which suggests that the growth 
rates of the pre-1984 are not sustainable, given the initial growth environment.  
Finally, overall policy and institutional environment appeared to have worsened in the Arab 
world (and to a lesser extent in South Asia), contributing –0.34% to the collapse of growth in the 
Arab region (and –0.13% to the change in growth South Asia).  On the other hand, this factor 
had negligible effects for East Asia and Latin America, while the apparent progress in Africa on 
this area had a marginal contribution of less than 0.1% to the change in growth in this region.  
However, this effect was more than outweighed by other effects, hence overall growth in Africa 




Table 9: Episodes of Growth in the Arab World and East Asia 
 
Median (annualized)  1970-84  1985-94       1995-1999 
East Asia  5.0  5.3           2.7 
Arab Countries  3.6  0.9            1.6 
      
Mean (annualized)       
East Asia  4.7  5.5           2.8 
Arab Countries  3.0  0.3            1.8 
Note:  The Arab countries considered here include: Algeria; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Jordan; Mauritania; Morocco; and, 
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Table 10:The Collapse of Growth in the Arab World (1985-94vs.1975-84) 
 
Change in growth attributed to: 
Average 
Actual change 
in Growth (1) 
Policy and 
Institutional 











Arab -2.614  -0.339  -0.418  -0.716  -1.473 
East Asia  0.021  0.010  0.538  -0.180  0.368 
África -0.750  0.089  0.072  -0.462  -0.301 
Latin America  -0.672  -0.016  0.007  -0.261  -0.270 
South Asia  0.106  -0.125  -0.635  -0.025  -0.785 
Note:  The decomposition of the actual change in the rates of growth between the two periods was computed using 
regression C3 of Table 7, where median values were used. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes overall economic growth performance in the Arab world since the mid 
1960s, with the key objective of developing a better understanding about what drives the growth 
process in the Arab region.  The growth record of the region has been rather disappointing.  First, 
it has not been high enough (as in the case of East Asia, for example) to facilitate sufficiently 
deep structural transformation in the region’s economies.  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, growth could not be sustained in the post-1985 era, when it was most needed to 
expend employment opportunities to a rising share of working age-population.  This growth 
failure, we argue, has deprived the region from realizing a potential “demographic gift”.  Instead, 
massive unemployment, especially among educated first time job seekers, became the major 
source of poverty and have already started to roll back the earlier impressive social gains 
achieved by the region.  Revitalizing growth in the Arab world would, therefore, suggests asking 
two pivotal questions: why has growth in the Arab world lagged behind those developing 
countries that could be taken to represent the frontier in terms of the development discourse (East 
Asia)?, and why has growth been so erratic and unstable in the Arab world? 
To address these issues, the paper estimates two models of long-run endogenous growth and 
growth persistence, using global data over the 1965-98 period.  The long-run growth model 
accounts for traditional growth fundamentals (initial level of development, overall institutional 
and policy environment, human capital) as well as other factors of particular relevance to the 
Arab region.  The significance of this latter set of growth determinants stems from the evidence 
that, even with good progress on the above fundamentals, growth usually does not happen 
without deliberate development strategies for exploiting (and/or overcoming) country-specific or 
region-specific potentials (constraints).  We argue that that there are at least three sets of such 
factors of relevance to the growth process in the Arab world.  These are the advantage of location 
and ecology; associated with export competitiveness and capacity to attract direct foreign 
investment as well as health; the “demographic gift”, associated with the demographic transition 
to lower age dependency; and the preponderance of regional and civil conflicts, with their 
multiple negative consequences for development.  The persistence of growth model, on the other 
hand, estimates determinants of the change in growth between the two periods before and after 
1985.  This year, as our analysis suggests, marked the end of the era of positive and relatively 
high per capita growth in the Arab world.  The key variable in this regression is “Conflict”,   27 
which is a covariate variable reflecting the extent of external shocks combined with the degree of 
latent social conflicts in a society (such as high income inequality) and the institutional capacity 
for managing conflicts within societies.   Therefore, this variable suggests that the combination 
of deep social conflicts and weak social and political institutions tends to magnify the effects of 
external shocks on growth, by leading to growth-retarding policies.   
These two models, which were corroborated by the data, permit addressing the two pivotal 
questions asked by this paper regarding the growth process in the Arab world.  The main 
conclusions of the analyses, which hopefully could have useful policy implications regarding the 
daunting task of revitalizing growth in the region, are summarized below.   
First, in order to attain the Asian frontier middle and high-income Arab countries and especially 
low-income Arab countries would need to continue to improve the overall enabling environment 
for economic growth.  This would require enhanced institutional quality, further accumulation of 
human capital as well as maintaining macroeconomic stability on a sustained basis.  As our 
results suggest closing this gap would consolidate the catch-up effect that favors low and middle-
income Arab countries because of their relatively lower standard of living compared to East 
Asia.  
Second, however our results suggest that East Asia has grown more rapidly than the middle and 
high income countries of the Arab region much more as a result of its ability to exploit the 
demographic gift and because of the high economic density along its coastal lines.  On the other 
hand, the diversified economies of the Arab region appear to have an unexploited potential 
relative to East Asia in terms of the high share of their land area dominated by temperate climate. 
These findings are important because they corroborate recent thinking in economic growth 
literature in that while achieving an overall enabling environment for growth is a necessary 
condition for growth to happen, is not a sufficient condition, however.  The implications of this 
is that growth would require deliberate strategic interventions by the state in order to facilitate 
exploitation of possible growth potential or to overcome major constraints.  
Third, the link between location and climate ecology to economic growth is well developed in 
the recent strand of the endogenous growth literature that emphasizes the role of geography.  For 
example, high economic density at coastal lines and along the banks of sea-navigable rivers is a 
major determinant of competitiveness of labor-intensive manufacturing exports.  Therefore, a 
deliberate and carefully planned strategy for intensifying economic activity along the vast coastal 
lines of the Arab world should provide an important source of long-term growth.  Among other 
things, this would require a provision of infrastructure, regulatory environment and other 
services.  In addition, any viable strategy for enhancing competitiveness of the Arab economies 
should include an explicit agenda for acquisition of technical know-how especially with the 
widening technological gap for the Arab world relative to the frontier (Ali, 2001). 
Fourth, the failure of the Arab region to exploit the “demographic gift” relates to the plethora of 
structural and policy problems afflicting Arab economies, which manifest themselves in 
dysfunctional labor and credit market (Yousef, 2000). The bloated and inefficient public sector 
and the stifling regulatory environment leaves little space for the private sector to be responsive 
to the ever increasing demand for labor generated by the nascent demographic transition that 
started to take hold in many countries of the region.  In as much as the demographic transition 
presents a serious development challenge for the region, with appropriate strategies it could also 
be turned into an opportunity for generating high and sustained per capita growth.  An insightful 
proposition in this regard was put forward by Dhonte, Bhattacharya, and Yousef (2000) who 
argue that massive construction in the housing sector could provide an answer to the challenge of 
the demographic transition.  They argue that both housing finance and investment are driven by   28 
the growth of the working age population.  The key insight behind their proposal hinges on their 
argument that, “the dynamics of the housing sector are closely related to the demographic 
transition”.  They went on to describe this process where they stated that,  “as the working age 
population expands there is a strong acceleration in housing investment while indigenous 
financing trails, creating a possible constraint on investment. As the process matures, however, 
housing investments levels off, while the housing stock continues to grow, so that housing-
related savings catch up and eventually exceed the flow of investments.  The catch is in the take 
off stage, when the availability of financing is a constraint on investment; the operation of 
housing saving schemes and the development of mortgage markets, not the provision of public 
housing, is the answer”(pp 14). Such a strategy would require an important strategic role for the 
public sector especially in the area of regulation, including better-defined and enforced property 
rights, land titling and reducing the historical biases of development policy in favor of 
investment in plants. 
Fifth, conflicts are not only key sources of political instability, but they are also major constraints 
for high and sustained growth.  Civil wars were found to have impeded the growth of the mixed 
oil economies (Algeria, Iraq) relative to East Asia; as well as the growth of lo w-income Arab 
countries relative to the relatively safe middle-income countries of the region.  The estimated 
effects, however, are likely to substantially underestimate the true effects of civil wars, which 
could also damage institutions and other factors influencing growth.  Also the many regional & 
international wars, though not directly analyzed in the growth accounting exercise, must have 
exacted significant costs on the region.   Resolving the problem of the high risks of regional and 
international wars would obviously require a just and comprehensive resolution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict being the core of the region’s political crisis.  In addition, resolution of other 
regional conflicts would require enhancing the Arab League capacity for promoting cooperation 
and conflict resolution among its member states as well as between the League members and 
other neighbors and partners.  Addressing the problems of the civil wars--which remain a serious 
challenge for many Arab countries-- would require a fundamental rethink regarding the treatment 
of cultural and religious minorities in the Arab world.  Recent evidence on the causes of civil 
wars suggests that civil wars are essentially a response, usually by minority groups, to political 
repression and economic deprivation inflicted by a dominant central state (Elbadawi and 
Sambanis, 2000). 
Finally, the central role of “social cohesion” in the ability of an economy to sustain growth, 
especially following external shocks is a profoundly important finding.   Social cohesion could 
be high when a society is relatively homogenous (for example due to religious and ethnic 
homogeneity or because of very low income or wealth inequalities).    On the other hand, in 
socially diverse societies, strong institutions are required for mediating conflictive (but not 
necessarily violent) interests among social groups.  According to our analysis, social cohesion in 
the Arab world is impaired by low standards of political rights throughout the region, and high 
income-inequality in most countries as well as high social diversity in a few others.   Improving 
political rights as a means for enhancing social cohesion in the Arab world, I will argue, is 
perhaps the one area of public policy (as well as popular activism), which is likely to yield the 
highest return for economic and political development.  First, with increased globalization 
destabilizing shocks are likely to increase rather than decrease, leading to more frequent episodes 
of growth collapse in countries with low social cohesion.  Second, viewing civil wars as extreme 
cases of lack of social cohesion, it is clear that improving the standards of political rights should 
also be a top priority for maintaining the territorial integrity and peace of the countries in the 
region.  
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Appendix Tables 
Appendix Table 1:  Human Development and Initial Conditions in the Arab World 
Average Schooling 
Years 
Life expectancy  
at birth  
GDP per capita   
1960-84 1985-98 1960-84  1985-98 1960 1985 
Gini  
Coefficient 
               
Mixed Oil Economies (MOE)  2  4  56  64  1145  1859  39 
   Algeria  2  4  55  68  1145  1859  39 
   Iraq  1  3  57  61  -  -  - 
Oil Economies (OE)  3  6  60  72  2232  11429   
   United Arab Emirates  3    63  74  -  24971  - 
   Bahrain  2  5  64  72  -  8797  - 
   Kuwait  3  6  67  76  -  10329  - 
   Libya      55  69  -  -  - 
   Oman      51  70  696  5607  - 
   Qatar      62  73  -  -  - 
   Saudi Arabia      55  69  3768  7440  - 
Diversified Economies (DE)  2  5  58  67  510  1543  41 
   Egypt  2  5  52  64  360  890  - 
   Jordan  3  6  64  69  -  1929  40 
   Lebanon      64  68  -  2462  - 
   Morocco      54  64  696  1173  39 
   Syria  2  5  57  67  475  1036  - 
   Tunisia  2  4  57  67  -  1771  42 
Primary Exports Economies (PEE)  0  2  43  51  -  315  - 
   Djibouti      41  48  -  -  - 
   Mauritania    2  44  51  -  -  - 
   Sudan  1  2  45  52  -  -  - 
   Yemen  0  1  44  53  -  315  - 
Arab World  2  4  55  65  1190  5275  40 
East Asia (EA)  5  7  62  71  1442  6097  40 
   Hong Kong  6  9  71  78  3008  13690  42 
   Indonesia  3  4  50  62  249  603  33 
   Malaysia  4  6  63  71  975  2587  50 
   Singapore  5  6  69  75  2699  13180  40 
   South Korea  6  10  62  71  1256  5190  35 
   Thailand  4  6  60  68  466  1333   
Sub Saharan Africa (SSA)  2  3  46  51  601  862  46 
Source: Global Development Network Growth Database and International Data on Educational Attainment (Robert J Barro and     
               Jong-Wha Lee) 
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Appendix Table 2:  Macroeconomic Environment in the Arab World 
 
  Govt. 
Expenditures 
Privte Investment  Public Investment  M2/Y  Openness  Inflation 
  1972-84 1985-98  1960-84  1985-98 1960-84 1985-98 1960-84  1985-98  1960-84  1985-98 1960  1985 
Mixed Oil 
Economies (MOE) 
    29  20  12  10  35  54  58  45  8  17 
   Algeria      29  20  12  10  52  54  58  45  8  17 
   Iraq              19           
OE  34  49          29  61  118  114  7  2 
   United Arab Emirates              22  55  107  118     
   Bahrain  33  33          52  67  219  189  9  0 
   Kuwait  35  66          39  89  100  98  7  3 
   Libya              31  72  90       
   Oman              19  30  97  85     
   Qatar              23  61      5  3 
   Saudi Arabia              17  51  96  77  7  1 
DE  39  32  14  14  14  11  42  78  65  78  8  10 
   Egypt  49  36  12  11  13  12  47  79  51  51  9  14 
   Jordan      19  18  17  10  58  106  121  125  10  6 
   Lebanon    34            132    92     
   Morocco  33  30  12  12  11  10  34  53  46  56  7  5 
   Syria  41  25          37  53  45  59  8  17 
   Tunisia  32  34  13  14  15  12  35  46  60  86  9  6 
PEE  43  33  12  11  10  6  17  39  64  74  14  39 
   Djibouti    35            72    115     
   Mauritania  43    15  12  16  10  15  23  97  106    7 
   Sudan      10  10  5  3  20  17  31  15  14  72 
   Yemen    32            46    61     
Arab World  27  30  16  14  13  9  32  62  87  86  12  17 
                      
EA  20  20  19  24  8  9  37  61  102  136  25  5 
   Hong Kong                        6 
   Indonesia  20  18  15  21  8  8  28  44  12  21  99  11 
   Malaysia  27  27  18  22  11  12  26  38  55  65  4  3 
   Singapore  20  22          39  74  89  156  4  2 
   South Korea  16  17  22  27  6  8  59  81  312  362  14  6 
   Thailand  17  16  20  29  7  8  32  67  42  76  6  5 
SSA  26  30  10  11  10  9  19  24  64  70  14  20 
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Appendix Table 3:  Demography and Labor Market 
 
 
Population Size  No. Young Age Dep.  
(1-14 yrs) 
No. Old Age Dep.  
( 64 yrs up) 
No. Working Age Population  Labor Force 
   1960 1985 1999  1960  1985 1999  1960  1985  1999  1960 1985 1999  1960  1985  1999 
Mixed Oil 
Economies  17647  37196  52747  7885  16554  20430  581  1290  1875  9181  19352  30442  5404  9958  16182 
   Algeria  10800  21879  29950  4726  9628  11251  415  864  1174  5659  11387  17526  3316  5929  9913 
   Iraq  6847  15317  22797  3159  6926  9179  166  426  701  3522  7965  12916  2088  4028  6269 
Oil  Economies  6544 21436  33936  2809 8965 13809 218 492 969 3517 11979  19158 1951 7191  11563 
   United Arab 
Emirates  90 1379  2815  38 391 752 2 18 60 50 970  2003 25 720  1393 
   Bahrain  149  425  666  65  135  205  4  10  19  80  280  443  43  178  300 
   Kuwait  278  1712  1924  98  636  650  6  22  36  174  1054  1238  116  668  764 
   Libya  1349  3786  5419  584  1758  2103  55  87  169  710  1941  3148  442  1128  1550 
   Oman  558  1397  2348  242  631  1031  15  34  62  301  732  1255  160  402  625 
   Qatar  45  358  565  18  98  187     3  14  27  257  364  16  183  306 
   Saudi Arabia  4075  12379  20198  1765  5317  8881  136  317  609  2174  6745  10707  1149  3912  6625 
Diversified 
Economies  49142  91737  125072  21248  37746  44029  1651  3496  5429  26243  50495  75614  17144  31318  46405 
   Egypt  25922  46511  62655  11006  18390  21925  852  1794  2801  14064  26327  37929  9254  16279  23684 
   Jordan  844  2644  4740  375  1244  1843  35  95  139  434  1305  2758  238  666  1398 
   Lebanon  1968  3275  4271  801  1227  1384  114  169  248  1053  1879  2640  561  976  1482 
   Morocco  11626  21648  28238  5211  8988  9375  301  858  1221  6114  11801  17642  4255  7945  11211 
   Syria  4561  10397  15711  2025  5018  6496  173  301  477  2363  5078  8738  1464  2932  4933 
   Tunisia  4221  7262  9457  1830  2878  3007  175  278  543  2216  4105  5907  1372  2520  3698 
Primary Exports 
Economies  17486 33694 49287 7653 15384 20852 522  899 1517 9311 17411 26918 6642 11695  18095 
   Djibouti  83  391  648  34  172  269  2  10  21  47  209  358  -  -  - 
   Mauritania  991  1766  2598  418  797  1133  28  55  83  545  914  1383  522  825  1198 
   Sudan  11165  21459  28993  4947  9448  11392  328  577  915  5890  11433  16686  4220  7897  11510 
   Yemen  5247  10078  17048  2254  4966  8058  164  257  498  2829  4855  8491  1899  2973  5387 
All Arab World  90819 184063  261042  39596 78648  99120 2972 6177 9790 48252 99237  152132  31141  60161 92246 
East Asia  158241  278857  347509  65621  101394  100079  5087  10740  17461  87533  166723  229969  63008  123729  174274 
   Hong Kong  3064  5456  6721  1253  1279  1224  86  408  686  1726  3769  4811  1183  2733  3542 
   Indonesia  93996  163036  207022  37764  63041  64385  3137  5863  9310  53096  94132  133328  36658  67986  99370 
   Malaysia  8140  15677  22710  3685  6062  7740  278  584  914  4177  9030  14056  2816  6083  9334 
   Singapore  1646  2736  3952  637  603  721  31  132  216  978  2001  3015  541  1332  1943 
   South Korea  25003  40806  46858  10486  12229  10209  831  1751  3021  13687  26826  33629  8376  17669  23757 
   Thailand  26392  51146  60246  11796  18181  15800  725  2002  3316  13870  30964  41130  13434  27926  36328 
Sub Saharan 
Africa  223148 440005 643175 96408 198648 284819 6411 12724 18332 120328 228633 340024 105970  194909  281821 
    Source:  World Bank databaseAppendix Table 4. Location and Geography 
 
  % of Coastal and 
sea Navigable rivers 
Density of 100k around 
the Coastal and 
Sea Navigable rivers 
% of   
non temperate 
Mixed Oil Economies  3  200  96 
   Algeria  4  221  94 
   Iraq  1  178  98 
Oil Economies  59  179  100 
   United Arab Emirates  70  37  100 
   Bahrain  87  985  100 
   Kuwait  91  96  100 
   Libya  10  28  99 
   Oman  45  7  100 
   Qatar  96  63  100 
   Saudi Arabia  11  35  100 
Diversified Economies  40  186  75 
   Egypt  37  175  100 
   Jordan  12  52  89 
   Lebanon  100  337  0 
   Morocco  35  117  100 
   Syria  12  338  63 
   Tunisia  46  97  100 
Primary Exports Economies  35  23  100 
   Djibouti  95  8  100 
   Mauritania  7  14  100 
   Sudan  2  15  100 
   Yemen  37  53  100 
Arab World  42  150  92 
East Asia  60  1539  99 
   Hong Kong       
   Indonesia  24  453  100 
   Malaysia  83  528  100 
   Singapore  76  77  100 
   South Korea  89  6466  94 
   Thailand  27  170  100 
Sub Saharan Africa  27  79  98 
Source: GIS data        
 




2.  APPENDIX TABLE 4. LOCATION AND GEOGRAPHY 
  % of Coastal and 
sea Navigable rivers 
Density of 100k around 
the Coastal and 
Sea Navigable rivers 
% of   
temperate 
Mixed Oil Economies  3  200  4.2 
   Algeria  4  221  6.5 
   Iraq  1  178  1.9 
Oil Economies  59  179  0.2 
   United Arab Emirates  70  37  0 
   Bahrain  87  985  0 
   Kuwait  91  96  0 
   Libya  10  28  1.4 
   Oman  45  7  0 
   Qatar  96  63  0 
   Saudi Arabia  11  35  0 
Diversified Economies  40  186  24.7 
   Egypt  37  175  0 
   Jordan  12  52  10.7 
   Lebanon  100  337  100 
   Morocco  35  117  0.1 
   Syria  12  338  37.5 
   Tunisia  46  97  0.1 
Primary Exports Economies  35  23  0 
   Djibouti  95  8  0 
   Mauritania  7  14  0 
   Sudan  2  15  0 
   Yemen  37  53  0 
Arab World  42  150  8.3 
East Asia  60  1539  1.2 
   Hong Kong       
   Indonesia  24  453  0 
   Malaysia  83  528  0 
   Singapore  76  77  0 
   South Korea  89  6466  5.8 
   Thailand  27  170  0 
Sub Saharan Africa  27  79  1.8 
Source: GIS data      
 
 